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Animal Rights: Interconnections with Human Rights and the 
Environment 
1 THE EMERGENCE AND MAINSTREAMING OF LEGAL ANIMAL RIGHTS 
Legal animal rights are on the horizon.1 Not too long ago, the notion of animals as holders of 
legal rights still seemed utopian to most. However, the idea of animal rights is not novel; it finds 
its early roots in the works of philosophers and social reformers such as Jeremy Bentham2 and 
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause.3 Since the advent of modern animal ethics in the late 1970s, 
sparked notably by Peter Singer,4 animal rights have become widely theorised and popularised in 
moral philosophy. Though it has taken several decades for these philosophical developments to 
be reflected in legal arenas, the landscape has started to shift.  
 Animal law, and the corresponding academic field of legal animal studies, is flourishing. 
There is now a lively scholarly debate dedicated to establishing, elaborating and advancing the 
theoretical foundations and practicability of legal animal rights. Moreover, animal rights are 
gradually beginning to emerge and solidify in case law. Most notably, courts in Argentina5 and 
Colombia6 have extended the constitutional human right to habeas corpus and the underlying 
right to freedom to captive animals. Furthermore, courts in India have developed case law 
recognising a range of fundamental rights of animals, among them the right to life, dignity, and 
freedom from torture.7 And in May 2020, the Islamabad High Court, too, recognised legal animal 
rights and, moreover, linked the protection of animals to the human rights to life in light of the 
current pandemic crisis which has highlighted the ‘interdependence of living beings’.8 For now, 
these remain isolated acts of judicial recognition or creation of animal rights. The majority of the 
world’s legal systems continue to treat animals as objects; as property. Animals are things, which 
can be bought, sold, owned, traded, farmed, experimented upon, killed, and eaten for the sake of 
human utility. Although most systems also recognise animals as deserving a certain level of 
protection in deference to their status as living beings capable of suffering (the welfare 
approach), in most places animal rights have, thus far, been seen as a radical departure from a 
human-centred legal order which can make use of other living and non-living resources. The 
Argentinian and Colombian examples, along with increasing numbers of other cases elsewhere, 
may however represent the first manifestations of an incipient, more comprehensive formation 
of animal rights law.  
 The once quixotic idea of animal rights has thus suddenly turned into a viable legal 
possibility. While some still strongly object to the idea of animals having legal rights, it seems fair 
to say that legal animal rights are becoming mainstream. That is especially true in the world of 
scholarship, which continues to precede legal reality in most places: there is now a critical mass 
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of legal scholars who endorse the possibility (or reality) of animal rights.9 Indeed, some scholars 
have even gone a step further and simply take for granted that animals can, should, and do in 
fact have some legal rights, and proceed to explore more refined accounts of, and also to move 
beyond, animal rights. Many of the articles included in this issue of the Journal of Human Rights and 
the Environment reflect this development: Some of the authors argue at length that, and on what 
grounds, animals have rights, while others take these rights as their starting point and instead 
focus on their applications and implications. Still others go further, finding the notion of animal 
rights problematic because it does not go far enough, or builds on old ways of (Western, 
rationalistic, male, hegemonic) thinking that need to be decolonised, and from which animal law 
needs to be emancipated. 
2. RIGHTS OF HUMANS, ANIMALS AND NATURE: CONNECTIONS AND 
INTERPLAY 
An overarching theme running through animal rights discourse—one popping up throughout 
the contributions to this edition—is the (both symbiotic and at times conflicting) relationship, 
and the conceptual and political kinship, between animal rights, human rights and rights of 
nature. Animal rights are often discussed as a subspecies of the natural rights tradition (in the 
jurisprudential sense) which gave rise to the modern notion of human rights — and which has 
also inspired the recent movement toward the rights of rivers, mountains and ecosystems. From 
its inception, the language of animal rights has relied heavily, whether explicitly or implicitly, on 
the conceptual vocabulary of human rights. In their theoretical framing, animal rights are 
typically based on the very structures and features that justify the time-honoured concept of 
human rights. Whether the latter are grounded in agency, personhood, basic interests and needs, 
capabilities, vulnerability or precarity, the human rights framework offers fruitful points of 
connection and overlap with animal rights. Some core human rights, such as the rights to life, 
liberty, bodily integrity, and freedom from torture and inhumane treatment, can be readily 
rethought as animals’ rights, too.  
 The search for interconnections between human and animal rights may, for one thing, be 
driven by rhetorical or strategic motives. Human rights, as a generally well-accepted and well-
established idea and institution, offer a valuable point of reference for unfolding the more junior 
idea of animal rights. Animal lawyers need not reinvent the wheel — rather, they can seize and 
adapt the available normative and regulatory toolbox, by applying, for example, established 
principles of (human) rights formulation, adjudication, conflict resolution or implementation to 
the animal context. Familiar arguments from analogy, similarity or consistency make use of this 
cross-comparative approach, and have contributed to the main building blocks of (first wave) 
animal rights theory.10  
 But on a deeper level, viewing human and animal rights as part of the same normative 
project may also be undergirded by political and socio-psychological considerations. It has long 
been recognised in the human rights world that a key element in the power and force of human 
rights discourses is their extensibility. They build at a fundamental level from what is, in the 
animal law context, usually referred to as the argument from similarity. Arguments in favour of 
the rights of individuals within a more dominant or privileged strata of society often implicitly 
support the case for the extension of those same rights to disadvantaged or excluded groups.11 
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That the very structure of human rights discourses lends itself to extension on grounds of 
similarity is significant, but equally important is the increasing recognition of a factual link 
between the concerns of human and animal rights. 
 From the nineteenth-century practice of including non-European peoples as exhibits in 
zoos, to the labelling of Rwandan Tutsis as ‘cockroaches’ in the run up to and during the 
Rwandan genocide, to the rhetoric of Donald Trump in relation to the migrants trying to cross 
the Mexico-US border, the equation of people or population groups with animals has long been 
a horrifyingly successful strategy on the part of those wishing to instigate or justify mass 
violations of human rights.12 Furthermore, scholarship has identified significant parallels between 
the legal treatment of animal rights and women’s rights,13 and the weaponisation of animal-use 
practices as a tool to further the colonisation agenda by European settlers in the Americas;14 and 
one of the current editors has elsewhere discussed the striking parallels between the sanitisation 
of mass violence inherent in the regime of animal welfare law and that of international 
humanitarian law.15 Increasingly, too, research in the field of social psychology is tearing down 
the notion that human rights and animal rights can be separated at the cognitive level: insights 
drawn from experimental studies suggest that the act of rationalising and justifying the 
mistreatment and slaughtering of animals makes it easier for humans to rationalise acts of 
violence against other humans.16 
 Even apart from these notable political interconnections and interlocking mechanisms of 
collective violence, current events strongly indicate the need for a wider view of the rights of 
humans. Human wellbeing has now to be understood as incorporating the rights and interests 
both of animals and of ecosystems, in recognition of the dependence of humans and human 
society on healthy and functioning eco- and environmental systems. There is increasingly strong 
evidence to suggest that the emergence of zoonotic diseases with pandemic potential (such as the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus responsible for the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic) is made more likely by 
biodiversity loss, as the reduction in diversity of species and genotypes decreases the resilience of 
the natural world itself to the development of such diseases.17 In parallel, the transfer of 
pathogens from animals to humans is made ever more likely by the ever-closer contact into 
which humans and animals are being brought by the destruction of habitats, the loss of wild 
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spaces, urban sprawl, and live animal markets.18 An additional, and deeply worrying, threat arises 
from the habitual overuse of antibiotics in modern industrial farming, which is considered to be 
a major factor in the rise of antibiotic resistance, and which threatens the emergence of 
pathogens yet more destructive than SARS-CoV-2.19 Purely human interest would, even in the 
absence of any notion of animal welfare or rights, demand an urgent reassessment of humans’ 
relations with other species and with the natural world. A cross-comparative or more ‘holistic’ 
mind-set for thinking about the rights of humans, animals, and nature thus seems warranted 
against the backdrop of their real-life interconnectedness. 
3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS ISSUE 
The articles in this issue of the journal have been selected to explore the increasingly close 
connections between animal rights in moral and ethical theory, and the treatment of animals in 
law. In so doing, the articles highlight manifold and deep connections between animal and 
human rights, at the level of cognitive frameworks and practical implementation. Although the 
majority of the contributions adopt or adapt human rights-derived frameworks to the animal law 
context, the utility of the human rights framework in this field is also questioned, with some 
authors advocating a distinctive, ‘second wave’ approach. 
 The first two articles drill down into the fundamental questions underlying animal rights. 
In his article ‘Animalhood, Interests and Rights’, Juan Pablo Mañalich argues that animals should 
be understood as “rights-subjects”. Basing his argument on the interest theory of rights, 
Mañalich notes that animals have intentions and therefore interests, as opposed to nonsentient 
living beings, which only have needs. Animals can therefore hold legal rights. Mañalich employs 
Michael Tooley’s notion of the ‘particular-interest principle’ as a constraint for meaningful 
ascriptions of rights. According to the principle, beings can only hold such rights that could, at 
least in theory, further some of their interests. Mañalich argues that all animals which meet the 
criteria of ‘quasi-personhood’ should have the legal right to continued existence — the holding 
of which Mañalich understands as legal personhood. Thus, all animals that are quasi-persons 
should be recognised as legal persons from the point of birth. Furthermore, even animals that do 
not meet the criteria of quasi-personhood should, according to Mañalich, be recognised as 
holders of legal rights — though what rights such animals should hold would depend on their 
interests. 
 Joshua Jowitt, too, engages with the fundamental justification for animal rights in his 
contribution, ‘Legal Rights for Animals: Aspiration or Logical Necessity’. Jowitt argues from 
consistency, using the moral theory of Alan Gewirth to ground animal rights in the same source 
as human rights. Given that all agents necessarily claim a right to enjoy the conditions enabling 
them to exercise their agency (and thus to have at least the potential of realising their conception 
of the good), consistency requires such agents to recognise the right to the basic conditions of 
agency in all other prospective purposive agents: failure to do so would require them to reject the 
very basis they claim as sufficient for their own rights thereto. Jowitt’s is an ambitious 
justification for the moral rights of animals, in that although it shares many of the features of the 
similarity approach, it goes beyond it. Rather than relying on the moral force of consistency and 
on arguments from hypocrisy, he argues that inconsistency would be impermissible: it would 
necessarily invalidate the claim being made on the part of humans to possess basic moral rights. 
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As a result, any law that does not recognise and respect the basic rights ascribable to any and all 
prospective purposive agents — whatever their species — does not satisfy the criteria for validity 
as law at all. 
 In ‘Animal Rights, Legal Personhood and Cognitive Capacity: Addressing “Levelling-
Down” Concerns’, Joe Wills scrutinises a common concern levelled against animal rights: that 
extending rights to animals on the basis of their being sufficiently similar to so-called human 
‘marginal cases’ might endanger the moral and legal status of humans, especially those with 
severe cognitive impairments. Wills argues that this objection against the argument from species 
overlap is misplaced for two reasons. First, it is conceptually ill-founded, as it misses the point 
that animal rights advocates rely on intellectual capacities for pragmatic rather than normative 
reasons and invoke capacity as a sufficient rather than as a necessary condition for personhood. 
Second, drawing on empirical and socio-psychological findings, Wills argues that speciesism itself 
operates as a multiplier of oppressive dynamics towards marginalised humans, and conversely, 
that non-speciesist animal rights can contribute to a more inclusive and respectful human rights 
culture. 
 In ‘The Conceptual Challenges of Invasive Alien Species to Non-Human Rights’, 
Guillaume Futhazar addresses the problem of nonhuman rights collisions that inevitably arise 
once natural entities (such as animals and the environment) come to populate the realm of legal 
personhood. The case of invasive alien species perfectly exemplifies such a clash of individual 
animals’ right to life and an ecosystem’s right to integrity. Futhazar proposes to resolve this 
nonhuman rights conflict by drawing on established principles governing the limitation of 
human rights, notably the balancing of private and public interests. Lastly, because nonhuman 
rights representation and adjudication necessarily remain discussions among humans, Futhazar 
stresses that such practices must engage in epistemic plurality in order to gain legitimacy. 
 In her contribution to the edition, ‘Veganism, Dairy and Decolonization’, Maneesha 
Deckha examines the conflicts and confluences between animal advocacy and the rights of 
indigenous peoples. Engaging deeply with the history of animal use practices in the colonial era, 
and using the European colonisation of Canada as her case study, Deckha questions the 
construction of an inherent opposition between vegan animal rights concerns and the traditional 
animal-food interests of indigenous peoples. Highlighting traditions of respect for nature and the 
importance of familial and mother-child bonds in many indigenous cultures in Canada, she 
argues that the rejection of dairy that distinguishes veganism makes it a more natural ally to the 
decolonisation agenda than is often appreciated. She argues in favour of a reframing of veganism 
to highlight its rejection of the dairy industry as having the potential to bring important critical 
and decolonizing value convergences to the fore. 
 In his article ‘Second Wave Animal Ethics and (Global) Animal Law: A View from the 
Margins’, Iyan Offor contextualises animal ethics in terms of two waves. Animal law scholars 
have, according to Offor, so far mostly based their work on utilitarian and rights-based 
approaches to animal ethics. However, Offor highlights numerous problems with such first-wave 
approaches, such as their assumption that animals deserve moral and legal consideration in virtue 
of being like humans, and their reliance on liberal concepts such as rights. Instead, Offor 
suggests that animal law scholarship would benefit greatly from second-wave, critical, 
intersectional animal ethics. 
 In the final article in the collection, ‘Is There a Need for a New, an Ecological, 
Understanding of Legal Animal Rights?’, Brian Favre too argues that there is a need to move 
beyond the traditional animal rights debate. Animal rights, he argues, offer only a short-term and 
partial solution to the task of integrating human and animal societies in ways that allow a mutual 
accommodation. Although animal rights contest the place of animals within the legal order, 
rights paradigms rely on the radical subjectivism that structures Western legal thought and its 
central, dichotomous division between ‘persons’ and ‘things’. As such, animal rights offer a 
‘revolution’ only at a shallow level: they remain within the larger, dualistic and anthropocentric 
 
 
paradigm. In order to move beyond a wholly anthropocentric legal order, Favre argues, we need 
to dispense with the focus on the individual rights subject, and instead move to a complexity-
responsive and situated analysis of individuals within communities, which he calls an ecological 
understanding of law. 
 Together, the papers in this issue show the maturity of the field of animal law. Animal 
rights are no longer to be confined to the margins of academic and broader social debate; rather, 
they are an essential part of the discussion on how to deal with the manifold social and ecological 
problems with which we are now confronted. Though they may have lost some of their radical, 
revolutionary flair — indeed, as this edition shows, animal rights are now seen in some quarters 
as the orthodoxy to be critiqued — they have gained a weight which indicates that the idea has 
come of age. 
 Particularly striking in all of the contributions to this thematic issue are the parallels 
between animal rights and human rights, human needs, and human wellbeing. Mañalich and 
Jowitt demonstrate that some of the major philosophical justifications for human rights must, if 
applied consistently, also give rise to rights for at least some animals. Wills shows that the oft-
heard rebuttal — that animal rights arguments from human marginal cases threaten the rights of 
certain humans — is incorrectly premised and is not borne out by socio-psychological evidence. 
Futhazar draws from the lived experience of balancing individual human rights and societal 
imperatives to imagine a legally mediated accommodation between animal and ecosystem rights 
paradigms. Deckha explores the natural convergence of interests between certain animal rights 
positions — primarily ethical veganism — and the decolonisation agenda. And finally, though 
they begin from very different premises and employ different methodologies, both Offor and 
Favre question the value of rights frameworks, preferring instead contextual and relational 
understandings of law as being better suited to meeting both humans’ and animals’ needs. 
 Reading the articles in this collection as a set, it is clear that a sharp dichotomy between 
human and animals rights is not just dubious, but that there are a wealth of productive 
interactions to be had between lawyers working on animal rights, human rights and 
environmental law, both from the academic and the activist standpoints. Viewed in this way, and 
in addition to their own manifold contributions, the articles in this collection set out a 
compelling and exciting future research agenda. We look forward to seeing the results. 
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